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INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the phenomenon of preference for timing in the temporal resolution of uncertainty and its implications for the structure of utility functionals defined on uncertain consumption programs in a multiperiod framework. A series of postulates is considered, beginning with indifference to timing and then proceeding to various forms of nonindifference. Some of the latter postulates are formulated in terms of a new definition of timing premium for early resolution of uncertainty. In the former case expected utility functionals are implied (given other axioms) while nonexpected utility functionals are admissible when indifference to timing is weakened. In particular, a rationale is provided for the specification of implicit weighted and weighted utility functionals in multiperiod contexts. These functionals have been axiomatized in atemporal frameworks in Chew (1983 Chew ( , 1989 ) and Dekel (1986) , where it is shown that they are capable of explaining Allais-type violations of expected utility (see also Machina 1983 ).
Our analysis is axiomatic. The first central axiom is the intertemporal consistency of preferences. The issue of consistency has been recognized as important in dynamic analysis since the seminal paper by Strotz (1956) and consistency is maintained in the vast majority of studies in economic dynamics. Expected utility specifications are intertemporally consistent but Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) show that consistency alone does not imply an expected utility ordering.
The other key axioms below concern attitudes towards the way in which uncertainty resolves over time. It is recognized (Kreps and Porteus 1979; Machina 1984) that this timing is generally significant when considering a preference ordering for random income streams induced from preference for consumption streams, since in such contexts earlier resolution can improve planning. But the desirability of earlier resolution is not at all clear at the primitive level of consumption streams. Indeed, indifference to the timing of resolution is widely maintained, e.g., in expected utility specifications where the expected value is computed with respect to the joint distribution of consumption levels, the latter distribution determines the ranking of the consumption program independently of the way in which uncertainty resolves over time.
Some of our axioms are closely related to those that have appeared in atemporal axiomatizations. For example, consistency and timing indifference are closely related to the well-known key axioms of expected utility theory-the independence axiom (IA) and the reduction of compound lotteries axiom (ROCLA). But they are nonetheless distinct sets of axioms. In this regard it is important to distinguish between the formal axioms IA and ROCLA and the informal verbal explanations which often accompany them. The former are atemporal but the latter frequently introduce sequential variants of the original single period choice setting (see Raiffa 1970, p. 82; and McClennen 1983) . Thus mixtures of probability measures are often described as "two stage lotteries" where time is assumed to pass between stages. Even in such informal discussions, time is conceptual rather than real. In particular, monetary prizes realized at the final stage of the sequential lottery, rather than intertemporal consumption profiles, are the ultimate source of utility. The consistency and timing indifference axioms of this paper are the formal hypotheses which correspond to the Raiffa argument, extended to a real time framework where consumption-savings decisions can be modelled. Moreover, in our real time framework, nonindifference to timing is plausible and an analysis of related issues (e.g. the definition of premia for early resolution) can be undertaken.
Just as in the case of the atemporal literature, our interest in nonexpected utility orderings is motivated by the evidence against the empirical validity of expected utility theory which has accumulated in the behavioural experimentation literature originating with the Allais paradox. (See Machina 1982 for a discussion of this evidence.) But in a multiperiod setting there is an additional reason for considering more general utility theories-the expected utility specification is too rigid to permit the separation of intertemporal substitution from the degree of risk aversion. Such a separation is important, for example, in life-cycle based asset pricing models (Hansen and Singleton 1983) where some researchers have conjectured that it could improve the poor empirical performance of these models.2 Section 2 contains the body of the paper. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section 3. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
PREFERENCE ORDERINGS
Our formal analysis is conducted in a two period model since that suffices to convey the crux of our argument. The extension to an arbitrary number of periods is described briefly.
Consumption ct in either period t = 1, 2 is constrained to lie in X, a bounded interval in the nonnegative real line. The space of Borel probability measures on X, endowed with the weak convergence topology, is denoted M(X). Figure 1 , think of cx and (1 -cx) as describing the probability distribution of a random variable which is correlated with consumption levels in both periods and whose realization is observed at the start of period 1. The t = 1 consumption level is also observed at the start of period 1, after which the remaining future is described by a probability measure m' E M(X) for second period consumption.
At t = 1, the utility function Ul: D--+ R represents the preference ordering on consumption programs. At the start of period 2, preferences on the remaining future, namely random period 2 consumption, are represented by U2: X x M(X)-> R. The utility functions U' and U2 are related by some of the axioms below, but at this stage they may be specified independently of one another. The dependence of U2(cl; m) on cl reflects the dependence of the t = 2 preference ordering on the consumption level cl realised in the previous period. But note that (in common with Johnsen and Donaldson 1985) it is assumed that preferences are independent of unrealised past alternatives. 2 In the empirical literature, Hall (1985) and Zin (1986) have argued for the importance of such separation. They achieve it by adopting the preference specification of Selden (1979) and Selden and Stux (1978) . Other non-expected utility specifications which permit the disentangling of ordinal and risk properties of preferences can be found in Kocherlakota (1986) and Chew and Epstein (1987) . The inadequacy of multiperiod expected utility theory in this regard is demonstrated in the latter paper.
We now consider several axioms for these utility functions. The first is a common technical assumption.
Continuity (C). For each c1 E X, U2(Cl; *) is continuous on M(X).
The existence of such utility functions could be proven from more basic postulates on preference orderings (Debreu 1954 ).
The first key axiom is consistency. It parallels that adopted by Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) in their contingent commodity framework. The two consumption programs ranked on the right side of (1) are represented in Figure 2 . Both involve certain consumption c at t = 1 and a "coin flip" at t = 1 which determines whether m or p (m' or p resp.) is the probability distribution corresponding to t = 2 consumption. If the equivalence in (1) were violated, then with probability a > 0 the choice made at t = 1 would be regretted at t = 2.
Consistency (CS). For all c E X, oc E (
Notice that (1) is not the independence axiom. For instance, the latter is a statement regarding one utility function, while (1) involves the utility functions in both periods. The precise link between IA and CS depends on which of the remaining alternative axioms is adopted. The two consumption lotteries in (2) are portrayed in Figure 3 . They share a common certain period 1 consumption level and a common probability distribution ocm + (1 -oc)m' for period 2 consumption. But they differ in the timing of the resolution of uncertainty as defined in Kreps and Porteus (1978) . In one lottery, a "coin flip" is performed at t = 1 to determine whether m or m' applies for t = 2, while in the other lottery the "coin flip" does not occur until t = 2.
As mentioned in the introduction, TI is widely maintained, if only implicitly; for instance, that is the case whenever M(X x X) rather than D is taken to be the choice space since the former identifies the two lotteries in (2). (A specific example is the specification in Selden and Stux 1978; see footnote 1.) But TI leads back to expected utility theory as described in the following theorem and the ensuing discussion. the Theorem, which we now describe, presents a more striking picture: Consumption lotteries which extend over T > 2 periods may be defined as in Kreps and Porteus (1978) , henceforth KP (1978). The C, CS and TI axioms have natural extensions to this larger domain.3 Then it is immediate that the preference orderings prevailing at each period t, t = 2, ..., T, must conform to expected utility theory. Note that if the model at t = 1 is a snapshot of an ongoing modelling process, then it follows from the t = 0 version of the Theorem that an expected utility ordering prevails at t = 1 also and hence in all periods. Finally, it follows from KP (1978, Corollary 3) that utility in any period (say t = 1) is the expected value of some utility index of remaining consumption, where the expected value is computed with respect to the joint probability distribution of consumption that is induced by the consumption lottery. In particular, there exist functions A(-) and B( ), the latter positive, such that Note that m is not measured in units of consumption and may more accurately be termed a "timing probability premium" or a "timing odds ratio premium". (See the discussion at the end of this section.) This axiom is weaker than the requirement that U2(c; ) be increasing in the sense of first degree stochastic dominance.
Existenice of Timing Premium (ETP). For each os E (0, 1), c E X and m, in' e M(X) such that U1(E[c, nil) ? Ul(E[c, In']), t(a
' This is a weaker form of betweenness than appears in Chew (1983) and Dekel (1986) who assume that the "better than"' and "worse than' sets are both convex in the mixture sense. See Lemma A in the Appendix. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have explored some axioms underlying the specification of intertemporal utility functionals in a stochastic setting. First, we identified consistency and timing indifference as the basis for expected utility theory. One of them must be weakened if non-expected utility specifications are to be admissible. In this paper, the weakening of timing indifference has been explored. An alternative route, of course, is to weaken consistency which is the approach taken in Chew and Epstein (1987) .
The choice of which route to follow in modelling consumption-savings behaviour could be enlightened if some empirical evidence could be brought to bear on the validity of timing indifference. There is a need to determine whether widespread and systematic violations of timing indifference can be uncovered in various experimental or market settings. We have suggested several specific forms of timing nonindifference which should be explored empirically. 1 -t(m, a) )5B.
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